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proposals then under discussion would have amended § 103(c) to give "research collaborations" a status equal to common ownership or assi~ent of rights to an invention under the statute. Testimony at last years heanng reflected a number of
concerns over that approach to resolvmg the concerns over the Oddzon decision.
For example, some opposed the concept of amending § 103(c) to equate "research
collaborations" with situations of common ownership and assignment. Such changes,
it was feared, would introduce more uncertainty into an area that already suffers
from excessive confusion. It was also suggested that a "loosened" § 103(c) standard
could ~ve rise to new types of double patenting problems, or could create undesirable sItuations such as two patents issued to separate entities on inventions that
were mere obvious variations of each other.
The current proposal effectively addresses the concerns that were expressed last
year.
• The current proposal does not depart from the requirement of common ownership or assignment as found in current section § 103(c). AI! a result, no issues
arise regarding the difficulties of defining what constitutes a "research collaboration" or how courts would deal with such a definition .
• Under the amended standard, § 103 will continue to prevent multiple patents
from issuing to different legal entities on "obvious" variations of an invention
where there has been no common assignment or ownership of the invention.
It does so by continuing to preserve the abiHtr of a first inventor who has
not abandoned, suppressed, or concealed an Invention to prevent another
party from obtaining a patent on an obvious variant of that Invention. If the
first and second parties both file patent applications, only one will obtain a
patent, as is the case today.
• No new issues of "double patenting" will arise under the amended standard.
This is because in situations where only 102(0 is implicated, there will be no
"other patent." If there is another patent, section 102(e) will prevent the
issuance of a later patent on an obvious variation of that first patent.
Thus, the legislation effectively responds to the concerns voiced last year.
I commena the Subcommittee for taking steps to improve the collaborative research and development environment in the United States. The proposed amendments will improve certainty in operation of the patent law, and will resolve many
of the concerns voiced by the university community last year. If enacted, the legislation will promote research among the university and private sector, primarily by removing disincentives and risks that would otherwise deter such cooperation.
Thank you for the opportunity to express my views.

Mr. SMITH. Professor Thomas?
STATEMENT OF JOHN R. THOMAS, PROFESSOR OF LAW,
GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY LAW CENTER, WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. THOMAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before the Subcommittee. I have come in my personal capacity as a concerned observer of the patent system.
Let me recap by stating that to understand the purposes of the
CREATE Act, an overview of patent law fundamentals may be appropriate. For an invention to belatented, it must meet two fundamental requirements, novelty an non-obviousness. The novelty requirement is found in Section 102 of the Patent Act and it requires
that an invention just be different, really just be basically different
from what has come before. Section 102 also details in a lot of detail, and when I teach this section I call it the "long march" of all
the different sources of knowledge that may be considered in these
inquiries, things like patents, earlier publications, earlier public
uses, and the sum of this knowledge, as you said, Mr. Chairman,
is termed therrior art.
Now, one 0 the seven paragraphs of Section 102, paragraph (0,
prevents a patent from issuing to an applicant who did not himself
Invent the subject matter sought to be patented, and this makes a
lot of sense. Only the true inventor ought to apply for a patent and
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receive one. If the patent applicant merely derived that information
from another, he shouldn't. be awarded a patent. We ought to get
the true illNentor having the patent.
Now, importantly, 'for SectIOn 102(f).to -defeat a. patent, the patent or patent application must be identical to what was disclosed.
That is the anticipation or novelty requirement.' Generally speaking, even a small variation will block the use of Section 102(0.
Section 102(f) is infrequently used because ·as a predicate to derived information from another, that other person'llIUst have invented it first. So usually, one of those rrovisions that speaks to
the first inventor getting the patent wi1 appl¥.:. So Section 102(0
is generally limited to trade secrets, which don t count as prior art
under another provision, and foreign oral disclosures, disclosures
that occurred overseas but were not written down. Those also don't
. count as prior art under any of the other Section 102 paragraphs.
_Now, as we have heard, Section 102(0 applies to non-obVIouS
through the OddzOn case. The second fundamental requirement of
patenting is .non-obviousness. This allows the combination of references to be employed or one .teaching with stirring in the knowledge of the prior art. In Section 102(0, it can be an input to nonobviousness. Derived information is evidence under current law of
non-obviousness or not.
Now, so. much, for the basics. What about the CREATE Act?
When consideDing the:consequenees of the CREATE Act, it is important to remember that·the :patent law was all about incentives,
and what are some of the incentives that the' CREATE Act might
cause?
Well, first, the.CREATE Act might encoura~e innovative individ.uals .to make their. inventions publicly avaIlable in the United
. States. by .publishing, by patenting or some other mechanism. If
they don't,. then ,another .individual might come along, make a
. minor variation, 'and be 'able to obtain a patent on that invention.
This effect comports with the general notion of the patent law that
we want people to publish. We want people to disclose their innovations.
However, the CREATE Act might also have a ''listen but don't
talk" effect. On the other hand, it may make inventors less willing
to collaborate out of fear that others will take what has been dis·closed to them, make a minor modification, and then seek patent
protection themselves, although there are other mechanisms in the
patent law for the original inventor to claim that she is the first
inventor, such as provoking interference or claiming that she
should be a joint inventor. Those are more costly and may not be
available in all circumstances.
The CREATE Act might also encourage individuals to go abroad,
listen to all disclosures, bring that disclosure back in this country,
make a minor modification, and obtain a patent. This arrangement
effectively would resurrect the old English notion of a patent of importation, which were granted not to the first inventor, but for the
first person who brought a technology into the realm.
I also observe that by expressly excluding Section 102(0 from
non-obviousness considerations, that would be the only one of seven
paragraphs of Section 102(0 that says it doesn't apply to obviousness. The negative implication is that all the other paragraphs do
1
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apply for non-obviousness determinations. That is pretty much
what the courts do right now, but there are a couple of the more
obscure sections of 102, Section 103(c) and (d), where the Federal
Circuit has said in dicta do not apply to non-obviousness. So, in effect, this bill might not only overturn the principal holding of the
OddzOn case, it might overturn the dicta, too.
Finally, it is important to remember that sometimes one prior art
t:eference, like a scientific publication or a patent, applies under
more than one paragraph of Section 102(0. So I think you would
want to stress that if a reference was available under another
paragraph of Section 102, as well as 102(0, that it would apply as
prior art. So you could add the word "exclusively" into Section
102(0 to avoid this difficulty.
Thank you very much.
Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Professor Thomas.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Thomas follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOHN

R. THOMAS

I appreciate this opportunity to appear before the Subcommittee. I have come
today in my personal capacity as a concerned observer of the patent system.
The Cooperative Research and Technology Enhancement Act of 2003 (the CREATE Act) succinctly provides that prior art available under 35 U.S.C. § 102<0 may
not be considered as evidence of obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103. The effect of
the Act is to overturn the 1997 holding of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit in OddzOn Products, Inc. v. Just Toys, Inc.,1 which ruled that derived prior
art may serve as evidence of obviousness.
To understand the impact of the CREATE Act, an overview of some patent law
fundamentals may be appropriate. For an invention to be patented, it must meet
two fundamental requirements: novelty and nonbviousness. The novelty requirement, stipulated in § 102 of the Patent Act, requires that the invention differ from
earlier knowledge. Section 102 details which knowledge-such as earlier patents,
publications and public uses-ma~ be considered in this inquiry. The sum of this
knowledge is temIed the "prior art in patent parlence.
One of the seven paragraphs of § 102, paragraph <0, prevents a patent from
issuin§ to an applicant who "did not himself invent the subject matter sought to patented. 2 This provision presents something of a standing requirement, mandating
that only the true inventor apply for a parent. If a patent applicant merely derived
the invention from another person, then he should not be awarded a patent. A
prima facie case of derivation entails a showing of another's prior conception of the
claimed subject matter along with an awareness of that conception by the applicant
or patentee. 3 Importantly, to defeat a patent or patent application, the derived information under § 102(0 must be identical to the claimed invention. Generally speaking, even a small variation will block the use of § 102(0.
Section 102(0 is not often used in patent acquisition proceedings at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). Even in adversarial proceedings, such as interferences and enforcemer:t litigation, the courts have not employed § 102(0 with great
frequency. The scarce use of § 102(0 results from the fact that a predicate to derivation is that another person first invented the subject matter sought to be patented.
As a result, another prior art provision, such as § 102(a), ordinarily applies to such
cases. 4 Parties adverse to the patent generally will find proofs of patent invalidity
more straightforward under § 102(a), which does not entaiLthe nettlesome issues of
communication and copying.
As a result, § 102(0 is most often employed in factual circumstances where
§ 102(a) does not apply. In particular, § 102(0 is not limited to inventions conceived
''in this country," nor have courts imposed a requirement that the knowledge be
1122 F.3d 1396 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
235 U.S.C. § 102<0 (2000).
3 Price v. Symsek, 988 F.2d 1187 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
435 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000) denies a patent if "the invention was known or used by others in
this country, or patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country. before
the invention thereof by the applicant for patent. . . ."
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publicly accessible as they have in § 102(a).6 Paragraph (0 would be the only part
of § 102 that would apply, for example, to oral disclosures that occurred abroad, or
to derived knowledge that has been kept as a trade secret.
The second fundamental ~uirement of patenting, nonobviousness. is set out in
§ 103 of the Patent Act. 6 To be considered nonobvious. the invention must not have
been within the ordinary capacities of a person of ordinary skill in the art.7 Unlike
the novelty requirement of § 102, a patent or patent application may fail to meet
§ 103 even ,though its subject matter is not identically disclosed in the prior art. A
combination of different teachings. or even small changes from a single teaching.
mE!)' be used to show that the invention would have been obvious. 8
'i
Section 102(0 relates to the nonobviousness requirement of § 103(a) in the following way. Section 103(a) does not expressly define which prior art may be considered when a court. or USPTO patent examiner, has to decide whether the invention
would have been obvious. Generally speaktng;'the courts have filled this gap by
holding that prior art described in § 102), including "paragraph (0, serves as the basis
for nonobviousness determinations. 9 U~PTO regulations comport with these holdings. tO Congress has also specified in § 103{c) that § 102{f) art is exempted from nonobviousness considerations if the prior art under § 102(0 and the cloomed invention
were either owned by, or subject to an obligation of assignment to. a single entity
at the time the invention was made. l l In essence, the CREATE Act would expand
this limited exception, instead excluding § 102(1) art entirely from nonobviousness
determinations.
Several possible consequences flow from the CREATE Act. First, the CREATE Act
would encourage innovative individuals to make their inventions p~blicly available-for example. by publishing or patenting the invention-in the United States.
If they do not" then another individual may make a minor modification to the disclosed invention and patent it himself. This effect comports with the general notion
in patent law, that prior art b!l.publicly available, rather than secret knowledge.
On the other hand, the CREATE Act may encourage individuals to file patents
on inventions that are obvious variations of derived information. For example, it
would be possible for an individual to attend a technical conference overseas. listen
to an oral disclosure of another's invention. and then obtain a U.S. patent claiming
a minor variation of the disclosed subject matter. This arrangement effectively resurrectS the old English notion of a "patent of importation" to the first person disclosing 'an invention domestically, even though that person was not the first inventor.t2
It is important t\l note that the true inventor is not wholly without remedy in
such circumstances. He may, for example file a patent application and attempt to
provoke an interference under 35 U.S.C. §102(gX1). However, this step may entail
considerable costs that § 102(0 did not. Note also that the true inventor may not
be able to prove that he is the first inventor outside of interference proceedings, due
to the fact that his activities did not occur "in this country" under the language of
35 U.S.C. § 102(g)(2).
In this vein, it does not appear that the CREATE Act works towards international
harmonization llf the patent laws. Consider Article 54(2) of the. European Patent
Convention, which provides:
The state of the art shall be held to comprise everything made avai1able to the
public by means of a written or oral description, by use, or in any other way,
before the date of filing of the European patent apphcation.
Under European Patent Convention, subject matter derived from foreign oral disclosures counts as prior art, while under the CREATE Act it may not.
r.See OddzOn Products, Inc. v. Just Toys, Inc. 122 F.3d 1396 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
Under 35 U.S.C, § 103(a) (2000):
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed or described as
set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the subject matter sought to be
patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious
at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said
subject matter pertains.
735 U.S.C. § 103(a).
8Roger E. Schechter & John R. Thoma8, Intellectual Property: The Law of Copyrights. Patents and Trademarks 370 (2003).
90ddzOn Products, Inc. v. Just Toys, Inc. 122 F.3d 1396 (Fed. Cir. 1997), According to the
OddzOn court, prior art under paragraphs (c) and (d) of § 102 does not apply to nonobviousnes8
determinations under § 103(a).
10 37 C.F.R. § 1.l06(d).
11 35 U.S.C. § 103(e} (2000).
12See Martin J. Adelman et at., Patent Law: Cases and Materials 427-28 (2d ed. 2003).
6
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In terms of cooperative research, the CREATE ACT may make innovators more
willing to make use of discussions with their colleagues in future work. On the other
hand, it may make innovators less willing to collaborate, out of fear that others will
modify their inventions and obtain patent protection on them. This concern is less
pressing for domestic than forei~ inventors, as a U.S.-based inventor would be able
to demonstrate prior inventorship under 35 U.S.C. § 102(g)(2). In addition, both foreign and domestic inventors may be able to claim status as joint inventors under
35 U.S.C. § 116.
I also observe that by expressly excluding § 102(0 prior art for nonobviousness,
the CREATE Act implies that prior art available under the six remaining paragraphs may be consulted for purposes of § 103. This result largely comports with
current case law of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and its predecessor courts. However, it should be noted that in the OddzOn case, the Federal Circuit stated in dicta that two of the more obscure _paragraphs of § 102-the public
abandonment bar of paragraph (c) and the delayed U.S. filing bar of paragraph (d)did not apply to nonobviousness. 13 The CREA'fE Act may well be considered to have
overturned the dicta of OddzOn as well.
Finally, it is important to remember that sometime one prior art reference-such
as a scientific journal articl&-may be described by more than one paragraph of
§ 102. Congress may wish to specify that prior art that is available under both
§ 102(0 and another paragraph or § lO2-for example, the statutory bars of
§ 102(b}-may be consulted during the nonobviousness inquiry of § 103. Put differently, the CREATE Act could be amended to specify that § 102(0 prior art may
not be considered for purposes of nonobviousness only if that subject matter is prior
art exclusively under § 102(0.
Thank you for hearing my testimony. I would be delighted to answer any ques~L

.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you all for pointing out how important this
kind of collaborative research is to the economy and for supporting
what we are trying to do with this legislation, which is to eliminate
some of the concerns that we have about the OddzOn case, and
that is much appreciated.
Actually, today's hearing is almost a quintessential example of
what hearings are supposed to do, which is refine and tweak legislation to try to improve it, and you all have made several suggestions.
What I would like to do, Dr. Soderstrom, is to ask you and Mr.
Kushan to respond to a couple of the suggestions made by Mr.
Steffe and Mr. Thomas. Both Mr. Steffe and Mr. Thomas have
mentioned Section 102(0. Professor Thomas, in your prepared testimony, you talked about some concerns you had about foreign inventors, as well, which I would like to go into in a minute.
And then, also, I don't want to leave you all, Professor Thomas
and Mr. Steffe, in a position where you can't respond. What I want
to do is get a discussion going among you four experts to see what
we need to do.
But let me read from Mr. Steffe's written testimony, and it will
be very precise in regard to that Section 102(0, and then ask Dr.
Soderstrom and Mr. Kushan to respond initially, and then the others respond afterward.
This is Mr. Steffe's testimony. "In fact, I would go further than
the proposed bill by removing mention of Section 102(0 from Section 103(c) and by amending Section 102(0 to read, 'A person shall
be entitled to a patent unless he did not himself invent the subject
matter sought to be patented, except that subject matter communicated from a co-inventor shall not be considered prior art under
this subsection.' My proposal would address, among other things,
13See OddzOn Products. Inc. v. Just Toys, Inc. 122 F.3d 1396 (Fed. Cir. 1997).

